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Abstract—Autonomous and self-driving vehicles are appear-
ing on the public highways. These vehicles commonly use
wireless communication techniques for both vehicle-to-vehicle
and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications. Manufacturers,
regulators and the public are understandably concerned about
large-scale systems failure or malicious attack via these wireless
vehicular networks. This paper explores the use of sensing and
signalling devices that are commonly integrated into modern
vehicles for side-channel communication purposes. Visible light
(using a CMOS camera) and acoustic (ultrasonic audio) side-
channel encoding techniques are proposed, developed and eval-
uated in this context. The side-channels are examined both
theoretically and experimentally and an upper bound on the line
code modulation rate that is achievable with these side channel
schemes in the vehicular networking context is established. A
novel inter-vehicle session key establishment protocol, leveraging
both side-channels and a blockchain public key infrastructure, is
then presented. In light of the limited channel capacity and the
interoperability/security requirements for vehicular communica-
tions, techniques for constraining the throughput requirement,
providing device independence and validating the location of
the intended recipient vehicle, are presented. These reduce the
necessary device handshake throughput to 176 bits for creating
symmetric encryption and message authentication keys and in
verifying a vehicle’s certificate with a recognised certification
authority.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular communication systems are becoming more
widely adopted as vehicles are given increased autonomy in
the world. The response times of electronic systems are much
faster than human-in-the-loop control systems, and this is a
motivator behind increasing autonomy in vehicles as they can
enhance safety. There is significant, and growing, research
activity in vehicular communications. A key interest has been
early stage autonomous systems that identify and respond to
impending threats (e.g. someone about to run a red light)
and having this information exchanged in a wireless chan-
nel between the vehicles, with the vehicles issuing warning
indicators to the human operators or alternatively proactively
taking control of the vehicle and braking[29]. These concepts
have developed into systems that can maintain more extensive
control over the entire vehicle and, subsequently, groups of
vehicles; for example, platooning [30], where one vehicle leads
a group of vehicles and spacing between the vehicles is strictly
controlled using inter-vehicle communications. Amongst other
benefits, this can help mitigate shockwaves that occur on
highways due to human-in-the-loop reaction times after a
vehicle brakes[26].
A significant concern in intervehicle control scenarios is
that of security and availability of data. A malicious attack
against a vehicle is of great concern due to the fact that the
vehicle can be operated entirely autonomously and, potentially,
can be used as a weapon[26]. The wireless communications
between vehicles and infrastructure are a particular cause
for concern as they can be relatively easily intercepted and
swamped by a suitably equipped attacker. For example, wire-
less transmissions in the 2.4 GHz band are not localised to
specific vehicular traffic, making it practicable for a mobile
attacker to travel around and propagate malicious attacks and
destructive interference against legitimate vehicular communi-
cations. Natural disasters e.g. earthquake, and other emergency
scenarios may result in the failure or unavailability of the
wireless infrastructure, whilst simultaneously giving rise to
significant exodus of vehicles from the region.
Previous work has proposed the use of hardware related
side-channels [26] as a mitigation to this interference and
eavesdropping problem in vehicular networking. Of particular
interest, and one of the initial motivators for our work, was
the observation that both ultrasonic systems (parking aid)
and visual camera technology (adaptive headlight cornering
camera) already exist on the front of many modern vehicles.
More extensive camera capabilities are also available through
the impact and accident logging devices that are increasingly
incorporated in new vehicles. Ultrasonic audio and CMOS
camera visual light devices exhibit high levels of directionality,
and favourable signal attenuation properties that make it phys-
ically more difficult for an attacker to eavesdrop, intercept,
inject or generate interference in these channels. A drawback
to the use of these “commodity” hardware side-channels,
however, is that they have a relatively low throughput, thus
requiring the development and implementation of protocols
that minimise the throughput requirement across the channels.
In this paper we explore the feasibility of establishing the
secure infrastructure for low data rate intervehicular commu-
nications, using sidechannels, in the absence of continuous RF
or wireless infrastructure support.
At a high level, the key contributions of this work can be
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summarized as follows:
• This paper presents the first implementation and eval-
uation of the effective use of ultrasonic audio and
CMOS camera visual light side-channels for secure
inter-vehicle communications.
• The hardware and encoding system is described and its
performance is evaluated and characterised.
• The system and its implementation is demonstrated to
have significant physical and structural security and
integrity properties.
• The constraints imposed by these side-channels neces-
sitated the development of a new scheme for small
throughput, secure, attributable exchange of session
key information between vehicles.
• The identity of the vehicle being communicated with is
authenticated, both through certificate checks and visual
identity (image processing) means.
• Blockchain is used as the inter-vehicle message trans-
port, as it provides a secure, verifiable, shared, open
and distributed ledger. It is also device and platform
agnostic.
• System models, algorithmics and select performance eval-
uations are provided to demonstrate the performance and
potential of the scheme.
II. HARDWARE RELATED SIDE-CHANNELS
Vehicular networking situations present some interesting
challenges for effective data throughput using (commodity
camera) visual side-channels. In many of the evaluated sce-
narios, the reliable throughput of the visual side-channels
can be as low as 15 bits/s for a 30 frame/s CMOS camera
using line-coding techniques. This paper focuses on the use
of standard CMOS cameras, of the type currently employed
in modern vehicles. Two specific problems arise in the use of
these cameras - those due to transient frames and exposure
control. A transient frame is a captured frame where the
transmitted data is not fully captured by the receiver because
the modulation time of LED’s is much faster than a CMOS
camera’s exposure time leading to a physical upper bound on
the maximum signaling rate. A transient frame can not be
decoded into either a 1 or a 0 if it is taken independently. For
robustness, transient frames require a safety margin beyond the
Nyquist sampling rate which limits the maximum signalling
rate. A hill-climbing approach to finding optimal software
controlled configurations is shown in Fig 1. This involved
detecting modulation using the approach described in Fig.
3 for each of 8 different exposure times, ranging from 0.1
to 2.2 × 10−11 seconds/pixel, with a goal of minimising
detection errors and processing time. The value colour channel
is used as it is hue independent and therefore can be used
for detecting modulation from head or tail lights on a car.
The number of transition mistakes metric shows that the best
configuration is a high downsample ratio and 2 look ahead
frames. Evaluating adjacent frames in a sequence tends to fail
due to the transient frame effect. A lookahead value greater
than 2 leads to an increase in error as frames become less
temporally correlated. Higher frame rates and increases in
the captured modulation rate (as described by Danakis in
[6]) were evaluated but offered little gain due to the outdoor,
noisy, occluded and motion-involved scenarios that prevail in
our target environment. Emerging camera technologies offer
significant promise for higher throughput and data rates in
vehicular scenarios; in particular advances in Visible Light
Communication optimised cameras e.g. [21], describe exper-
imental CMOS cameras which contains several special pixel
areas that react very quickly to rapid changes in incident light
in unconstrained environments. These classes of device will
benefit future vehicular networking scenarios (in particular
side-channel systems) as they offer impressive 15-Mbps/pixel
data rates. Algorithm 1 describes the flow and operation of
one technique for line-code signaling detection using a CMOS
camera.
In commodity form the ultrasonic channel is constrained
by the necessity to coexist with the parking aid functionality.
Again, using line coding techniques[7], bidirectional commu-
nication was achieved across this side channel at rates of
2Kbps using a 40kHz ultrasonic transceiver. The usable duty
cycle of the ultrasonic channel is, as expected, constrained
by both the incident angle of the signal and the transmitter
proximity (see Fig. 2. The period of the received waveform
is not affected by these changes. This finding influenced our
design decision see Fig. 3) to detect modulation through
the measurement of rising edges in the transduced sound
wave. Algorithm 2 describes one technique for detecting and
decoding an acoustically modulated signal transition.
For both side channels the noisy and occluded environment,
caused by two moving vehicles communicating with each
other in an ad-hoc bidirectional manner, proved to be a
significant limiting factor in establishing the signalling and
communication constraints and upper bounds for reliable
throughput. Algorithms 3 and 4 describe the binary classifier
and Overlap Processing approach used in this work.
Fig. 1. This CMOS camera experiment is a hill-climbing approach to finding
optimal software controlled configurations across 8 different exposure times
(ranging from 0.1 to 2.2×10−11 seconds/pixel). Note that the long processing
times are due to file access delays; the subsequent operational characteristics
presented will remain valid for real-time, in-memory systems.
The limited usable data rates and constrained channel capac-
ity could be construed as a major drawback to the present-day
use of these side-channels for intervehicular communication.
Fig. 2. Evaluation of the ultrasonic transducers shows that an increase in
duty cycle of the received wave form is correlated with both an increase in
angle off center and distance away from the transmitter. The system gain was
reduced for ease of testing, with validation performed at common vehicular
sensing ranges.
However we recognise that technological and device advances
will see rapid and significant increases in the available data
rates and channel capacities across both of these side-channels.
Moreover the presence of both ultrasonic and visual camera
systems in present-day vehicles argues to both established
platform metaphors and also to low cost integration and
deployability opportunities for such side channel approaches.
Finally the robust and directional nature of both sidechannels
affords physical security to the data exchanges, in addition to
any signal encoding employed.
Fig. 3. Novel decoding procedure that enables effective reuse of the exterior
sensing systems as side channels in a modern vehicle.
A. Physical security
The side channel approach accrues both physical and struc-
tural security properties. The ultrasonic channel has directional
propagation characteristic, in consort with the close range
of the platooning vehicles (typically no more than a few
metres) [29]. These sensors are bumper mounted and posi-
tioned to detect obstacles directly aligned with, or immediately
to the side of, the vehicle bumper. Their ranging properties
are typically tuned to a ∼10ft range and a ±45° detection
angle. Intercepting or injecting data into the bidirectional data
exchange necessitates positioning a transceiver in sight of
the ultrasonic transponders on both vehicles, in circumstances
where the platooning vehicles may be traveling at more than
60mph. On first consideration the visual channel may appear to
Algorithm 1 Video Preprocessing
1: procedure VIDEOPREPROCESS(F , r, l, a) . F is
a 4-dimensional matrix of n RGB image frames gathered
from a CMOS camera, r is the frame rate, l is the number
of quantisation levels and a is the number of lookahead
frames for frame comparison. From experiments, values
of l = 256 and a = 2 are chosen.
2: Φ ← (X ,Y ,S ,Θ ,Z )← LPR{F} .
Location (X ,Y ), scale S , rotation Θ and skew Z of a
detected license plate in the frame.
3: F ← Quantise{Max{F .r,F .g,F .b}, l}} . Convert to
the value colour channel and quantise the resulting image.
4: F ← Segment{F ,T{Φ}} . Segment an elliptical
region around the tail/head lights of the vehicle defined
by a geometric transformation of Φ (see figure 4).
5: F ← ∑mj=1 F [i, j]( 1σ√2pi e− 12 ( j−µσ )2)/(l ∗ m), ∀ i
. Apply a Gaussian kernel to the elliptical region and
normalise.
6: F ← 1−
(
F [i,:]−F¯ [i,:]
)(
F [i+a,:]−F¯ [i+a,:]
)>√(
F [i,:]−F¯ [i,:]
)>√(
F [i+a,:]−F¯ [i+a,:]
)> , ∀ i <
(i− a) . Compare frames a spaces apart using the
distance correlation metric.
7: F ← Distance{Rising{Otsu{F}}}/r .
Classify the correlations into two classes (see Otsu[24])
and set the matrix equal to the distance between rising
edges in seconds.
8: return F
Fig. 4. Mapping of φ (license plate location) to T{φ} (light modulation
source) for a car. A gaussian kernel is used at the location of T{φ} to weight
the pixels close to the light modulation source, which reduces errors due to
relative movements of the vehicles and distortions on the mapping of T{φ}
and normalisation is applied to allow the relaxation of dependence of the
distance between vehicles.
be more vulnerable to malicious external signalling. Vehicular
cameras often have lens with a wide field of view, and
headlight cameras are positioned towards the extremities of
the vehicle where they may be more susceptible to unwanted
targeting. Lasers and directive light sources can also be used
to attempt to “blind” a device by overloading its sensor. In ex-
periments these problems have been successfully surmounted
using structural security properties. By this it is meant that
camera processing is only targeted at those areas where it
is known that data can be expected. Specifically, the camera
sidechannel logic identifies brake lights on the forward vehicle
Algorithm 2 Sound Preprocessing
1: procedure SOUNDPREPROCESS(v,m) . v is a voltage
measurement of the ultrasonic audio transducer and m is
the modulation period. From experiments, a value of m
= 20 ms is chosen based on the processing speed of the
embedded device. d is buffered before entering Alg. 3.
2: normal routine:
3: v ← Voltage Measure{}
4: interrupt routine:
5: if v ≡ rising edge then
6: d← RisingEdgeDist{} . Distance in seconds
between this rising edge and the previous rising edge.
7: if d > m/2 then
8: return d
Algorithm 3 Overlap Processing
1: procedure OVERLAPPROCESS(F ) . Obtain the
differential manchester encoded signal.
2: µ← j ← 1
3: F ← Otsu{F}
4: for 1 ≤ i ≤ Size{F} do
5: if F [i] = 1 then
6: G[j]← G[j + 1]← µ
7: j ← j + 2
8: else
9: G[j]← µ
10: j ← j + 1
11: µ← µ⊕ 1
12: return G
(1, 2, or 3) at first contact, and validates their presence and
functionality. The dual camera imagery is processed upon
receipt in order to identify the visual sidechannel areas i.e.
the brake light signals, and all other camera imagery data
is disregarded. In general, the structural properties of the
sidechannel signalling areas remain unchanged; even through
cornering and acceleration/deceleration behaviours. A change
in the visible forward vehicle e.g. because of a lane change,
necessitates a reidentification process. It is important to note
that the visual channel can also be used to extract vehicle
specific identification information e.g. license plate data and
other identifying marks and shapes. Cumulatively the camera
sidechannel(s) can provide considerable physical and structural
assurance as to the source of the visual imaging data.
The preceding sections describe the creation and validation
of a secure intervehicle communication carrier that exploits
the relatively high bit rate and the observable source angle
properties of the sidechannels. The ultrasonic signal can arrive
from almost any angle, subject to the physical positioning of
the vehicles, and has a ‘relatively’ high bit rate; the visual
light signal arrives from an observable angle and has a rela-
tively low bit rate. These properties are exploited to enhance
throughput and the overall security of the communications.
Whilst the sidechannel data rates may appear low, particularly
when compared with DSRC and wireless approaches in the
literature[27], this scheme can function entirely independently
and autonomously from any highly available infrastructural
dependence e.g. WiFi, DSRC, or LTE. During wireless net-
work outages, in the presence of attack or compromise, or
for validation of data received through other channels, the
sidechannel approach can be successfully employed to keep
vehicles and platoons safely controlled and operational.
The following sections set out how the sidechannel system is
used to securely establish and disseminate PKI key exchanges
using a distributed blockchain implementation between mov-
ing (platooning) vehicles.
III. MINIMISING THROUGHPUT REQUIREMENTS IN
VEHICULAR COMMUNICATIONS USING SIDE-CHANNELS
Communication systems seek to maximize the amount of
data encoded and successfully conveyed per transmission
interval. When utilising the CMOS visual light and ultrasonic
side-channels, we seek to minimise the required information
content, or payload, of the message due to the low throughput
capability of the channels.
Many application layer protocols have been proposed and
implemented for inter vehicle communications[28]. For pro-
viding security and authentication capabilities between nodes1,
these schemes commonly establish symmetric encryption keys,
message authentication keys and also perform certificate
checks with central certification authorities.
In experiments, transmitting worst case key and check
data combinations through the side-channels has taken some
seconds. This magnitude of delay is not tractable in a vehicular
networking scenario. A number of approaches were evaluated
in order to reduce the size and volume of necessary exchanges
for enabling secure communication key exchanges between
the vehicles. The initial premise was to encapsulate both the
public key value and the certificate for every vehicle into
a database, such that only a small primary key value was
required to map to the required data. This could be naively
done online by contacting the “cloud” and requesting the
credentials mid-handshake. However, this approach requires
internet connectivity and also creates a broad new attack
surface that is easily targeted. A superior approach would
be to have the entire database offline and travel with the
1A key exchange algorithm usually requires the establishment of a pre-
master secret in order to securely construct a master secret. Typically [9],
this is performed by either exchanging fixed RSA public keys and en-
crypting/authenticating/sending the pre-master secret, exchanging fixed Diffie-
Hellman public keys and computing the shared secret directly or exchanging
both fixed RSA public keys and authenticated one-time-use Diffie-Hellman
public keys to compute a shared secret that is perfectly forward secure [11]
(which means that an attacker can not decrypt historic messages between
machines if the fixed RSA private key is compromised). All three of these
exchanges require at least one public key value to be exchanged, which is
typically at or above 32 bytes. For authentication by some central authority, a
certificate (e.g. X.509 certificate [8]) might also be exchanged that authenti-
cates the sender’s provided public key value, and this certificate is typically 1
kB in length. Key establishment protocols also include random values that are
exchanged by both parties in order to introduce randomness into the master
secret and protect against duplicated master secrets; these values are typically
at least 16 bytes in length.
vehicles themselves. One mechanism for achieving this would
be to have a centralised database that is secure and widely
trusted, and that can be synced to/by the vehicles periodically.
It is probable that such a centralised system would not find
favour due to the multitude of manufacturers, political regions
and vehicle types that may exist in such a downloadable
database. Blockchain based domain name systems/public key
infrastructures [3] were identified as conceptually suitable for
our work as they do not require centralisation in order to push
data into the distributed database - the integrity of the data is
assured by an underlying blockchain. The desirable principles
and features of these technologies for our side-channel system
are now articulated.
A. Blockchain Public Key Infrastructure
1) Blockchain: A blockchain [4] is a distributed pub-
lic ledger that allows a contributor machine to maintain a
verifiable record of transactions which are recorded in the
form of a series of interconnected blocks of data in the
ledger, and are considered to be secure from tampering and
revision. Each node can create and verify blocks and send
new transactions to the blockchain. Blocks hold timestamped
batches of transactions or, in some implementations, programs
or other data. Each block includes the hash of the prior block
in the blockchain, thereby linking the two blocks. Mining is
the term used to refer to the distributed computational review
process performed on each block of data. The creation of a
new block is both computationally costly and time consuming
(see Fig. 5). When the blockchain is robust, nodes on the
network will independently verify successful hashes on the
blockchain network and achieve consensus on creation of the
next block (even where neither party knows or trusts each
other). For instance, in cryptocurrencies[4] mining of a block
is subject to a difficulty metric and a reward mechanism.
The difficulty metric increases as the rate of block gener-
ation increases, thereby slowing the block generation rate
and mitigating against malicious mining. When a block is
discovered, the discoverer may award themselves a reward.
In cryptocurrencies, the reward is usually financial, e.g. a
certain number of BitCoins2, and agreed by everyone on
the network. This is an important facet of the underpinning
design of blockchain networks - this reward system makes it
economically futile for an attacker to attack the blockchain
network in order to gain benefit (i.e. rewrite previous blocks)
because the cost of successfully doing so is beyond the
2Bitcoin was chosen as the underlying blockchain by the Blockstack
developers because it has the lowest probability of the 50% hashing power
attack[4] succeeding (due to having the largest number of nodes participating
in the network). The developers provide a mechanism to transition Blockstack
over to a different blockchain in the event that one becomes more robust
than Bitcoin. Alternatives to Blockstack include NameCoin [18], which had a
dedicated blockchain. However the system did not have sufficient network
scale which resulted in a user achieving more than 50% of the hashing
power on the network and demonstrating power attack capacity. Emercoin
[10], is explicitly set up as a blockchain public key infrastructure, where
the blockchain is exclusively used for Emercoin. The likely susceptibility of
Emercoin to a similar power attack to that of NameCoin motivates our use
of the more widely used, larger user base Blockstack system.
available reward. It is therefore more profitable for nodes to
concentrate their computational resources on legitimate mining
of hashes in the blockchain because they will increase trust in
the system and accrue a higher economic reward in doing
so. It is of note that nodes cannot collude with each other in
the generation of hashes, as the proof that a node correctly
made a hash is unique to that node. This property adds
security to the blockchain network by thwarting large scale
malicious attacks from compromising the blockchain network.
As we propose to use blockchain in widely distributed, open,
intervehicular communication scenarios, it is critical that the
primary key access encoding infrastructure is demonstrably
robust and secure to large scale attack surfaces. The blockchain
infrastructure provides these capabilities.
2) Blockstack Decentralised Domain Name Service: Block-
stack is an open source, peer reviewed application stack
implementation that provides identity, naming, storage, and
authentication services [3]. Blockstack allows relatively large
amounts of data (max 8kB per entry) to be securely stored in
a distributed hash table by storing hash values of the data in
robust blockchain blocks (see Figure 4 in [3] for illustration).
It can be viewed as a distributed database that does not
require central management; attackers cannot amend entries in
the distributed hash table without being detected through the
checking of the underlying blockchain. A Blockstack server,
maintaining its own copy of the distributed hash table, was
implemented on a Cloud virtual machine and extensively
evaluated. Overall, the Blockstack system was found to be
very reliable.
A key feature of the Blockstack system, when used in
our vehicular networking scenarios, is that machines can
directly download a copy of the distributed hash table from
an untrusted source and independently verify the contents
using the blockchain with minimal computational requirement
[12]. Thus each vehicle in a platoon can independently and
individually acquire the required data structure. There remains
scope for further optimisation and evaluation of the timing
overhead for hash table lookups on various embedded devices
which contain a full copy of the distributed hash table.
3) Economic Benefit of an Attack on a Blockchain When
It Contains Extraneous Information: In section III-A we note
that there can be economic It is reasonable to surmise that
attacks on blockchain structures may be attempted on vehicu-
lar network data or vehicular platoons e.g. by well resourced
malicious groupings or foreign powers. Use of blockchain for
intervehicle data interchange is most likely to be, and remain,
secure when the userbase is large, thereby mitigating against
the 50% hashing power attack compromise [4]. 3
In the system described herein, the data inserted into the
blockchain relates to the PKI key data used to secure inter-
vehicular communications. As this data can, and will, expire
in the highly mobile vehicular environment, and as the use
of physical side-channels for transmission of these blockchain
entries is targeted, we express considerable confidence that the
system as described is secure under normal usage scenarios.
B. Index Key Size
A primary key that maps into a database must be unique
for every entity that stores information in that database. For
vehicles, a useful ’unique’ value that is already assigned
is the license plate number. It is known to the registered
vehicle and can be read, e.g. using OCR, by camera from
a following vehicle in a platoon. As previously noted any
data can be inserted into the database (blockchain) without
the need for a trusted certificate authority. As license plate
numbers are deterministic, an attacker could “brick” (i.e.
make unusable) license plate numbers in the database by
registering plate number ranges before the rightful owner
does. Combining the license plate value with a random value
“salt”, known only to the generating vehicle, immediately
prior to the generation of the public key information for the
exchange means that an attacker must seek to register all
license plate + salt combinations in order to succeed with a
“brick” attack. Ideally the random salt size would be as small
as possible as this data, of a fixed length (see Fig. 5), will be
transmitted through the vehicular side-channels when creating
the database primary key. The primary key value can be of a
fixed size by calculating it using a hash function as follows:
primary key ← Hash{license plate value || identity salt}
A reasonable key dimension, combined with a “cost” to
insert data into the block chain, provide an effective deterrent
to this attack approach.
Inserting data into a blockchain, and therefore a blockchain
distributed hash table (such as Blockstack) is not free. As
the scheme presented herein exploits the scale and number of
users on BitCoin to provide security and robustness against
the 50% hashing power attack surface, transactions on the
blockchain network requires the payment of small miner’s
fees as a reward mechanism for nodes to validate new blocks
in the network. Currently, this cost is about 0.05 USD. The
Blockstack mechanism also has its own additional fees built
3When new information is inserted into the Blockstack distributed hash
table, a clever mechanism is used to prevent revision of data as it is being
propagated throughout the distributed network of Blockstack servers: a hash of
the data about to be inserted to the distributed hash table is first released to the
network. After a period of time elapses (currently about 12 hours) the actual
data is released to the distributed hash table and its historic hash (existing at a
lower block height) can be checked independently. As time progresses and the
block height in the blockchain increases, it becomes harder for an attacker to
overturn previous block values until it becomes practically infeasible. In the
vehicular networking case, where human life may be threatened, an elapsed
duration to release should likely be of the order of weeks or months. It remains
an interesting, and rather fraught, research question.
in that brings the entire cost of a single low volume insertion
to 0.09 USD. Thus a brick attack against a license plate with
a salt will incur a significant financial cost. For a 32 bit salt
length, the legitimate license plate owner will pay 0.09USD,
whereas the cost of bricking the license plate is 0.09× 232 or
about 400MUSD. This figure varies depending on the value
of Bitcoin. We believe that this is a sufficient disincentive to
license plate attacks for all but state security interests.
In any event further efficiency, robustness and reduction in
storage and data transmission requirements are gained from
the observation that the certificate authority is required to
construct the trusted binding between a primary key value
and a cryptographic public key value. When downloading
information from the distributed hash table, data can be
selected to be downloaded only where entries are associated
with certificates from widely known certificate authorities -
or the subset of certification authority(ies) that we choose to
accept for our vehicular networking exchanges. Erroneous or
malicious insertions can be checked for just before registering
with a certificate authority to avoid collisions in the distributed
hash table.
As only a single 176 bit data exchange is needed, the side
channel system set up can be achieved quickly and efficiently.
The short message size enables rapid symmetric key informa-
tion exchange. This is essential due to the proximity require-
ment for the side channel system to function. In principle,
symmetric key establishment for a platoon has no defined
upper time bound; however, in the side channel situation
there are both physical and safety constraints on the upper
bound. In practice, the normal sidechannel operational range
bounds can be relaxed as the camera system can visually detect
vehicles at extended distances and the ultrasonic range can be
increased through power adjustment. These extended ranges
are necessary during initial platoon formation when using side
channels, during slow start up and in enabling side channel
only platooning in speed banded lanes, for example car pool
lanes that have a minimum speed. Clearly the extended range
provision is necessary to maximise intervehicular distance for
safe operation during the exchange of the key data (which
leads to synchronised control). The effective intervehicular
distance that, for safety reasons, must be maintained during the
initial connection setup will be bounded by the responsivity
of the side channel system (e.g. camera, ultrasonics, system
controller), the control and actuation characteristics of both
vehicles (e.g. braking, acceleration, steering) and regulatory
constraints (e.g. minimum required speed in carpool lanes).
IV. SESSION KEY ESTABLISHMENT PROTOCOL USING
SIDE-CHANNELS AND A BLOCKCHAIN PUBLIC KEY
INFRASTRUCTURE
We now present a novel session key establishment ap-
proach designed to integrate the security and communications
requirements identified in the previous sections. This pro-
tocol adopts several concepts from the TLS 1.2 handshake
methodology[17]. TLS was chosen as a good model to follow
because it is the most widely used key exchange protocol on
the internet and has withstood attacks for 20 years through
various versions, meaning that it is very robust. The main
differences between this protocol and the TLS 1.2 handshake
are the use of the blockchain distributed hash table to minimise
the throughput requirement and the use of the visual light
channel incorporating with the visual identifier to strongly
verify the location of the vehicle being communicated to.
Fig. 5. Network diagram of a blockchain-based public key infrastructure
for a vehicular platoon. 1) Blockchain (ledger): Provides underlying security
to information contained in Blockstack nodes. 2) Blockstack: Each node
maintains its own copy of a distributed hash table containing a public key
infrastructure used to authenticate communications between vehicles in a
platoon. The data stored is a public key, a Hash{identity salt || license
plate} and a certificate binding these two values for every vehicle. 3) Platoon:
Vehicles in the platoon hold their own copy of the public key infrastructure
contained in the Blockstack and securely communicate with other vehicles
in the platoon using the physical side channels. The system works with and
without live online connectivity to the blockstack. Intervehicular symmetric
session key generation is described in Figure 6.
The main communications/security features of this protocol
are:
• Very small throughput requirement. The ultrasonic
channel requires only 160 bits and the visual light channel
only requires 16 bits of data to be exchanged in the
handshake.
• Location of the vehicle being communicated to is
strongly verified. The mapping from φ to T{φ}, as
shown in figure 4, links the vehicle’s visual identifier,
e.g. license plate, with the information that is contained
in the visual light channel. Both pieces of information
are required for a successful handshake. The information
contained in the visual light channel is elaborated upon
below. License plate recognition is a widely researched
topic and an advanced license plate recognition system
such as OpenALPR [14] may be used to establish the
license plate data.
• Vehicle authentication. A certificate is checked as is-
sued by a widely known/accepted certificate authority to
authenticate the vehicle being communicated to.
• Practical forward secrecy. This algorithm is not per-
fectly forward secret because it does not feature one-time
use Diffie-Hellman cryptographic parameters. However,
the 256 bits of random values are exchanged by physical
sidechannel causing them to be unavailable to most attack
methodologies. The necessity for perfect forward secrecy
depends somewhat on the application in question; control
commands between vehicles are not typically considered
to be sensitive after the control has been safely executed
by the vehicle, as an attacker may also observe the
physical response of the vehicles e.g. turning.
• Secure symmetric encryption and message authentica-
tion. The symmetric key exchange and set up is achieved
very rapidly using only 176 bits.
• Verification of correct master secret generation. This
information is conveyed in the visual light channel as
shown below.
• Type of vehicle being communicated to is (weakly)
verified. Using just the mapping from φ to T{φ}, it
becomes much harder for smaller vehicles to impersonate
larger vehicles. Incorporating computer vision recogni-
tion algorithms, e.g. the SIFT algorithm [13], to detect
scale invariant features typical of certain types of vehicles
provides significant additional visual validation capabil-
ities e.g. mitigation of vehicle impersonation attacks. It
does, however, add some computational complexity and
broaden an existing attack surface so its use is bounded.
In broad summary, this paper establishes a means by which
secure communication exchanges between vehicles can be
achieved across visual and auditory sidechannels. The scheme
securely establishes the symmetric key for intervehicular com-
munication in the absence of any wireless or other centralised
infrastructure.
V. INHERENT SECURITY FEATURES OF THE SYSTEM
Beyond the previously described security and robustness
features of the scheme and, in particular, the benefits accruing
through use of a blockchain based approach, the system will
successfully protect against, and fold, a variety of physical and
signalling attacks. For instance:
• Physical attacks to the visual-acoustic channel e.g.
using drones or lasers. Such attacks are folded through
exploiting the duality and directionality of the vi-
sual/acoustic signals.
• RF jamming (physical) attack, where the symmetric
key has survived. The visual-acoustic communication
side channels remain both intact and fully functional so
the vehicular activity, e.g. platooning, can continue.
• RF channel jammed and key compromised. Detection
of, and protection against, this attack is offered by the
integration of blockchain with the sidechannels.
VI. CHALLENGES
The loss of use of one or more of the side-channels is
unavoidable from time to time. For instance, a vehicle may
be involved in a minor accident that breaks a headlight, i.e.
a visual compromise, or deforms a bumper, i.e. an ultra-
sonic compromise. Attackers may also disable channels on
purpose; for example, by breaking a headlight or covering
a transducer. Noting that this work focuses on the use of
visual and acoustic carriers as sidechannels, it is anticipated
Variable Description Variable Description
I Identity salt, 32 bits (fixed) L Visual identifier, (fixed)
φ← (x, y, s, θ, ζ) Location (x, y), scale (s), rotation (θ) and T{φ} Geometric transformation of φ that points to
skew (ζ) of origin of L light source origin
Prim Primary key that maps into blockchain DHT S Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman shared secret
(fixed) (different for every vehicle combination)
Pub Curve25519 ECDH public key (fixed) Priv Curve25519 ECDH private key (fixed)
R Session salt, 128 bits (changes every session) C Certificate for L, I and Pub (fixed)
K Symmetric encryption key (changes every M Message authentication key (changes every
session session)
Function Function
SHA256 Hash function [5] Curve25519 Shared secret calculation [2]
Blockchain Distributed hash table lookup [4][3] Scrypt Password based key derivation function [1]
Fig. 6. Session establishment protocol using side channels
that primary exchanges can, and will, be effected by standard
radio frequency transmissions under normal circumstances e.g.
DSRC. Use of the sidechannels as primary key exchange
paths would be expected when RF comms are unavailable,
when compromise is possible or suspected, or when additional
security is required for key exchanges. For instance, one
could envisage high-value convoys primarily employing the
sidechannel approach for securing intervehicular exchanges. In
practice, care should be taken to balance usability and security
in future implementations of this scheme; for high security
settings our recommendation is that key communications take
place primarily in the side-channels because attacks on the
side-channels are much harder to execute, and more readily
detected, than attacks on the standard radio frequencies used
in vehicular communications.
VII. FUTURE WORK
• Implementing the side-channels on dedicated embed-
ded devices and assessing the performance improve-
ment in real vehicular communications scenarios.
FPGA’s can be used to speed up the communications
processing on board the vehicle and can be directly in-
terfaced with the vehicle’s buses, for instance the control
bus or CANBUS.
• Speeding up and enhancing the efficiency of the
side-channels. This can be achieved by adding extra
transmitters/receivers that modulate separate information
in parallel; for example, by using multiple brake lights,
segmenting brake lights, using scrolling light patterns,
using non human-visible light sources; and through us-
ing multiple ultrasonic transmitters, MIMO techniques
and variable frequency transducers. Detector advances
will also contribute significantly e.g. the fast CMOS
sensor technology [21] mentioned previously with a 15-
Mbps/pixel data rate.
• Validating and enhancing the security of both
blockchains and blockchain public key infrastruc-
tures. The cryptographic algorithms behind blockchains
are robust and proven to be sufficiently secure. However,
the security of the implementation of the blockchain
network, and impact on the original security properties of
the underlying blockchain system when non-blockchain
related information is introduced, remains unclear (in our
example cryptographic information for securing vehicular
communications is inserted).
• Practical characterisation of visual and Auditory
Sensing Ranges. Drive testing is required to provide
input for establishing the real-world effective ranges of
each sidechannel, and for determining the upper and
lower bounds on detection and communication ranges.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Vehicular networking and communication is becoming more
common, in part driven by autonomous vehicles and the need
to increase occupant safety e.g. by reducing poor human-
in-the-loop reaction times in critical control situations. Of
particular concern to manufacturers, regulators and owners are
the risks of electronic attack and compromise of operational
vehicles via the vehicular communication infrastructures, e.g.
a large scale, localised interference attack on radio frequency
communication channels. This paper proposes a novel se-
cure inter-vehicle communication system using side-channels
(visual light and ultrasonic audio) that is highly robust to
interference and attack. The scheme verifies the location
and identity of the vehicle being communicated with, and
incorporates that vehicle identifier in the cryptographic setup
exchanges. An original key establishment handshake protocol
is also presented. This is primarily based on TLS 1.2 and
it limits the throughput requirement to 176 bits on the side-
channels when establishing symmetric encryption and message
authentication keys and when verifying a vehicle’s certificate
with accepted certification authorities. The system exploits
both physical side-channels, and employs a blockchain public
key infrastructure for interoperability between untrusted vehi-
cles and manufacturers. The side-channels provide enhanced
physical (directional) security to the transmissions, and are
directly useful in passing messages between vehicles and,
for instance, in maintaining the inter-vehicle distance in a
vehicular platoon.
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